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DIRECT AND INDIRECT JUDICIAL CONTROL 
OF COMMUNITY ACTS IN PRACTICE: 
THE RELATION BETWEEN ARTICLES 
173 AND 177 OF THE EEC TREATY 
Gerhard Bebr* 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty contains two differ-
ent judicial controls over the exercise of the powers granted to the Commu-
nity by the Treaty: (1) a direct control through an action in the European 
Court of Justice under article 173 to annul a Community act; and (2) an 
indirect control through reference by a national court to the Court of Jus-
tice under article 177 to review the validity of a Community act. I Each of . 
these controls is designed to ensure the legal exercise of power by Commu-
nity institutions. In form, however, they are quite different procedures. 
An action for annulment must be brought within two months of the 
publication or notification of the Community act challenged. In setting 
forth who may bring such an action, article 173 distinguishes between so-
called "privileged" plaintiffs (Member States, the Commission, and the 
Council) on the one hand, and private parties on the other. A privileged 
plaintiff has an unlimited right of action that permits it to contest any bind-
ing Community act (i.e., a decision, directive, or regulation) without fulfil-
ling any additional requirements. Conversely, a private party may contest 
only decisions addressed to it, or a decision disguised in the form of a regu-
lation or decision addressed to a third party, which is of "direct and indi-
vidual concern" to it.2 A private party has no right to contest a directive or 
a genuine regulation. 3 
In contrast, the indirect control provided by review of a Community act 
under article 177 is initiated by a national court. When called upon to apply 
a Community act in litigation, a national court may suspend the proceeding 
and at any time request a review of the validity of any Community act by 
the Court of Justice. Moreover, a court whose decision is not subject to 
• Honorary Legal Adviser of the Commission of the European Communities. - Ed. 
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 173, 
177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. 
2. For the meaning and development of the notion of "direct and individual concern" 
under article 173 of the EEC Treaty as derived from the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, see Stein & Vining, Citizen Access lo Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in a Transnational and Federal Context, 70 AM. J. INTL. L. 219 (1976), reprinted in EU-
ROPEAN LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 113 (F. Jacobs ed. 1976). See also G. BEBR, DEVELOP· 
MENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 62-85 (1981). 
3. This well-settled proposition was recently reconfirmed in Greek Canners Assn. v. Com-
mission of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 250/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3535, 3540 
(ground No. 5). 
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appeal must suspend the proceeding and request a review.4 While a Mem-
ber State, the Council and the Commission, or a private party can no longer 
challenge a Community act in an annulment action once the prescribed 
period for such an action under article 173 has expired, a national court 
may still do so through an article 177 review proceeding. This situation 
vividly demonstrates the important role a national court can play in ensur-
ing compliance with Community law. It also illustrates that review under 
article 177 is a "public" remedy, and not a "means of redress" available to 
private parties. 5 
The Court of Justice at first viewed the direct and indirect controls as 
two distinct and independent remedies and developed them accordingly.6 
However, its more recent jurisprudence suggests some convergence between 
these two procedures, resulting in the increased importance of the indirect 
control ofreview provided by article 177. Two major reasons for this devel-
opment may be suggested. 
First, the paucity of challenges by Member States, the Commission, and 
the Council to regulations and directives has lessened the importance of 
article 173. Member States have sought annulment of Council regulations 
on only three occasions.7 This may not be surprising, given that a Member 
State that participated in the preparation and adoption of a Council regula-
tion can hardly be expected to contest its legality. 8 Its right of action under 
article 173 makes sense only insofar as the Council adopts its regulations by 
a majority vote when provided for by the EEC Treaty.9 Where action is 
taken by a unanimous vote of the Council or without a formal vote, 10 an 
annulment action by a Member State appears rather unlikely. Just as rare 
4. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 177. 
5. See Sri CILFIT v. Ministry of Health (Case No. 283/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
3415, 3428 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 9); Lagrange, L 'action prijudiciel/e dans le droil 
inlerne des Elals membres el en droil communaulaire, IO REV. TRIM. DR. EUR, 268, 272-73 
(1974). 
6. See University of Hamburg v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Kehrwied (Case No. 236/82) 
(Ct. J. Eur. Co=. Sept. 27, 1983, not yet published) (Preliminary Ruling), digested in 1983 
ECJR 95; Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH v. Hauptzollamt Kiel (Case No. 158/80), 1981 
E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1805, 1838 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 44); Commission of the 
Eur. Co=unities v. Belgium (Case No. 156/77), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1881, 1897 
(ground No. 25). 
7. Only cases under the EEC Treaty are included here. See Italy v. Council of the Eur. 
Co=unities (Case No. 166/78), 1979 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 2575; Ireland v. Council of the 
Eur. Co=unities (Case No. 151/73), 1974 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 285; Italy v. Council & 
Co=ission of the EEC (Case No. 32/65), 1966 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 389. 
8. There has been only one case in which a Member State that had voted in the Council for 
the adoption of a regulation subsequently lodged an annulment action against it. Italy v. 
Council of the Eur. Co=unities (Case No. 166/78), 1979 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 2575. The 
Court admitted the action, taking the view that the conduct of a Member State in the Council 
is irrelevant to the exercise of the Member State's right of action under article 173. 1979 E. 
Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 2596 (ground No. 6). 
9. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 148 states: "Except where otherwise provided for in this 
Treaty, the conclusions of the Council shall be reached by a majority ofits members." Various 
Treaty provisions require the Council to act by a unanimous vote under certain circumstances. 
See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 75. 
IO. The Council has taken afarma/vote in over 100 instances. 
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as challenges by Member States to Commission regulations or directives11 
are Commission actions questioning Council regulations. 12 The rarity of 
such actions has reduced considerably the practical importance of the direct 
control of regulations and directives through annulment provided by article 
173. 
Second, the lack of any right for private parties to seek annulment of 
regulations and directives under article 173 has encouraged private actions 
in national courts. 13 This has, in tum, resulted in an increased number of 
references under article 177 from those courts to the Court of Justice for 
review of Community acts, particularly regulations. 14 Such reviews may be 
requested by a national court only when a Community act must be applied 
in litigation. Paradoxically, then, it primarily is due to the references of 
national courts that the Court of Justice has reviewed the validity of regula-
tions and directives. National courts thus have assumed an unexpected and 
important role in ensuring the legal exercise of Community legislative 
powers. 
This clear shift towards the indirect control of article 177 has had an 
effect on the relation established by the Treaty between articles 173 and 
177. As a result of this development, the Court of Justice may well have 
reduced some of the differences between the procedures provided for in 
these Treaty provisions. The present study seeks to examine the "very com-
plex question" 15 of the relation between articles 17_3 and 177 and, in partic-
ular, the extent of the convergence between these separate procedures. This 
I I. Cases involving Member State challenges to Commission regulations are Italy v. Com-
mission of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 12/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1731, and Italy 
v. Commission of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 11/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1527. 
Those involving challenges to Commission directives are France, Italy, United Kingdom v. 
Commission of the Eur. Communities (Nos. 188-90/80), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2545, and 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission of the Eur. Community (Nos. 52, 55/65), 1966 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 159. 
Member States challenge Commission decisions more frequently. There are over 20 cases 
in which they have done so. 
12. Commission of the Eur. Communities v. Council of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 
218/82), 1984 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~14,019 (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. Dec. 13, 1983), digested 
in 1983 ECJR 126; Commission of the Eur. Communities v. Council of the Eur. Communities 
(Case No. 22/70), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263. Two other cases of lesser importance con-
cerned internal matters of staff regulations. Commission of the Eur. Communities v. Council 
of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 70/74), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 795; Commission of the 
Eur. Communities v. Council of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 81/72), 1973 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 575. 
13. See, e.g., Unione Nazionale lmportatori e Commercianti Motoveicoli Esteri v. Council 
of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 123/77), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 845, 852 (grounds l 1-
12). In an early case, one national court made a reference to the Court because of the inability 
of a private party to challenge a regulation directly. W. Beus GmbH v. Hauptzollamt 
Milnchen (Case No. 5/67), 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep 83, 86 (Preliminary Ruling). See also 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Roemer in N.V. Internationale Crediet- en Handelsverenig-
ing 'Rotterdam' v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij (Nos. 73-74/63), 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 16, 22 (Preliminary Ruling) (delivered Dec. 16, 1963); Opinion of Mr Advocate General 
Roemer in Meroni v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal and Steel Community (Case No. 10/56), 
1958 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 177, 183-84 (delivered Mar. 19, 1958). 
14. By the end of 1983, more than 110 references requesting review of the validity of differ-
ent Community acts, primarily regulations, had been made to the Court of Justice by various 
national courts under article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 
15. This is how the Court of Justice described this question in University of Hamburg v. 
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study begins with an examination of some of the distinctive features of each 
procedure. 
I. THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
CONTROLS 
The procedures of articles 173 and 177 both are designed to ensure the 
legal exercise of Community powers. However, each procedure has some-
what different aims. Leaving aside the general, all-embracing right of ac-
tion of Member States, of the Commission and the Council, an annulment 
action under article 173 serves primarily to protect the interests of private 
parties against illegal decisions. Conversely, review of the validity of a 
Community act under article 177 guarantees the legal exercise of Commu-
nity powers consistent with the higher interests of the Community legal or-
der. The differences between these procedures are reflected not only in 
which parties and institutions may initiate each, but also in the scope of acts 
subject to review, the circumstances in which each of these procedures may 
be used, the independence of the remedies afforded by each procedure, and 
the nature (i.e., adversarial or not) of the respective procedures. 
A. Mzo May Initiate Each Procedure 
Under article 173 of the Treaty, a private party may bring an annulment 
action in its own right. A review of the validity of a Community act, on the 
other hand, may be requested only by a national court. Such a reference 
frequently is suggested by one of the parties to the litigation; ultimately, 
however, the national court decides whether or not to make the reference to 
the Court of Justice. 
This difference has a further consequence. In an annulment action 
under article 173, a private party may charge any ground of illegality that it 
sees fit to invoke. In a review proceeding under article 177, a private party 
may only submit observations within the limits of the charges raised by the 
national court in its reference to the Court of Justice. 
B. Acts Subject to Each Procedure 
Both annulment action and review of validity are directed against Com-
munity acts. However, a review of validity of a Community act performs a 
second fu:i;iction as well: it may concern the application of national mea-
sures implementing that act. Thus, should the Court of Justice declare the 
Community act invalid, the application of national implementing measures 
by the national court may be excluded as well. 
The divergent aims of these procedures are reflected further in the type 
of Community acts that may be challenged under each. A private party 
may seek only annulment of decisions under article 173 (although Member 
States, the Council, and the Commission may seek annulment of any bind-
ing Community act). Article 177, however, provides for review of any Com-
munity act, whether it be legislative or administrative in nature. 16 Indeed, 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Kehrwieder (Case No. 216/82) (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. Sept. 27, 1983, not 
yet published) (Preliminary Ruling), digested in 1983 ECJR 95. 
16. Thus, the Court has reviewed not only the validity of regulations and decisions, but 
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limiting review under article 177 to certain types of acts would be contrary 
to the procedure's very purpose, which is to ensure that Community powers 
are exercised in accordance with the EEC Treaty. 
C. Requirements for Admission 
The requirement in an annulment action that a private party be "di-
rectly and individually concerned" before it may challenge a decision ad-
dressed to a third party is obviously out of place in the case of a reference 
by a national court seeking review of a Community act. 17 For the admis-
sion of such a reference, it is only necessary that the question of the validity 
of the act be relevant and decisive to the outcome of the pending litigation. 
D. Independence of Remedies 
A review of validity under article 177 is independent of an action for 
annulment under article 173. This independence is illustrated particularly 
well by those situations in which an annulment action has been lodged 
without success. When this occurs, a national court still may request a re-
view of the validity of the very same act. Thus, if an annulment action by a 
private party contesting a genuine regulation was declared inadmissible by 
the Court of Justice pursuant to article 173, a national court could still refer 
the question of the regulation's validity to the Court under· article 177 .18 
Even if an annulment action was admitted by the Court of Justice, and later 
dismissed as unfounded, its dismissal would not prevent a national court 
from requesting a review of the act in question. In such an instance, the 
national court well might question the validity of the act on different 
grounds than the unsuccessful private party. 
A successful action that brings about the annulment of an act would, of 
course, make a reference meaningless. Referring to its judgment of annul-
ment, the Court of Justice could simply find the reference of a national 
court concerning such an act without object and declare it inadmissible. 
Another question remains, though: May a national court also request the 
review of an act if a party to the main action failed to exercise its right to 
bring an annulment action? In such a situation, it is sometimes argued that 
the party may no longer question the validity of the act in question before a 
national court. Several arguments refute this view, however. 
First, the national court has the power to refer questions regarding the 
validity of a decision to the Court of Justice under article 177. Therefore, 
only the national court's doubts - and not those of a private party - about 
the validity of an act are relevant. The failure of a private party to bring an 
annulment action under article 173 may indicate that the private party con-
siders the particular Community act valid. However, that is by no means 
also of directives. See, e.g., Tedeschi v. Denkavit Co=erciale s.r.l. (Case No. 5/77), 1977 E. 
Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1555, 1579 (Preliminary Ruling). 
17. See Co=ission of the Eur. Co=unities v. Belgium (Case No. 156/77), 1978 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1881, 1897 (ground No. 25). 
18. See Milchwerke Heinz Wfihrmann & Sohn v. Co=ission of the Eur. Co=unities 
(Nos. 31, 32/62), 1962 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 501, 507-08. 
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decisive for a national court faced with the decision whether to refer the 
question of the act's validity to the Court of Justice. 
Second, article 177 of the Treaty confers on national courts an exclusive 
and unconditional right19 to reque~t a review of validity. It would be con-
trary to this right if its exercise were conditioned on the procedural conduct 
of one of the parties to the main litigation. 
Third, analogizing to the right of action a Member State has under arti-
cle 173, it cannot convincingly be argued that because a Member State 
failed to contest a Community act, its courts can no longer request a review 
of the validity of the act under article 177. Such a restrictive approach 
would be inconsistent with the very purpose of the review procedure. Like-
wise, the use of article 177 to ensure the legal exercise of Community pow-
ers should not be dependent on the actions of private parties. 
Fourth, the position that review of a decision under article 177 should 
be excluded when the private party failed to bring an annulment action 
under article 173 presents particular difficulties when the decision was ad-
dressed to a third person. Under article 173, a private party may challenge 
such a decision only if the decision is of "direct and individual concern" to 
it. Thus, if a reference for review were excluded because a litigant had not 
brought an annulment action to challenge a decision of direct and individ-
ual concern, a national court first would have to examine the complex ques-
tion whether the action met the requirements of "individual and direct 
concern." Only if the national court found that the decisionfai/edto meet 
these requirements could the question of the decision's validity then be re-
ferred to the Court of Justice. This situation would place the national court 
in the difficult position of deciding a highly technical preliminary question, 
one that poses problems even for the Court of Justice, before it could refer 
the question of the decision's validity to the Court. 
Finally, while the view that a reference should be barred when a private 
party has failed to exercise its right to seek annulment of a decision under 
article 173 is sometimes based on the need for legal certainty, this argument 
is unconvincing. While both regulations and directives - acts of Commu-
nity-wide application20 - may be reviewed under article 177, this review 
procedure rarely has been subject to attack as undermining the need for 
legal certainty. Why then should the review of a mere decision cause 
greater concern in this regard? It is up to the Court of Justice to assess the 
gravity of the charges and determine the consequences that a declaration of 
invalidity would have with respect to the important goal of ensuring legal 
certainty and meeting the legitimate expectations of concerned parties. Ar-
ticle 177 - and this is worth stressing in this connection - is an indepen-
dent remedy that is not subsidiary to an action for annulment under article 
19. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 177, gives inferior national courts the right to request a 
preliminary ruling. Moreover, it obligates national courts of last instance to request such a 
ruling when the validity of a Community act is in doubt. 
20. EEC Treaty, supra note l, art. 189, states in pertinent part: 
Regulations shall have a general application. They shall be binding in every respect 
and directly applicable in each Member State. 
Directives shall bind any member to which they are addressed, to the result to be 
achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means. 
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173.21 It neither distinguishes among the various acts (i.e., regulations, di-
rectives, and decisions) subject to review nor subordinates this review to the 
requirements of an annulment action or its possible exercise. 
In a ruling rendered under article 41 of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) Treaty, the Court of Justice did not make the review 
of the validity of a decision conditional on an annulment action. 22 While 
the Commission's individual decision, which imposed a Community levy, 
was addressed to the private party in the dispute, that party's failure to 
bring an annulment action under article 33 of the ECSC Treaty did not 
preclude the Court from admitting the reference for review. This ruling 
suggests that the failure of a private party to exercise its right of action is 
not relevant to the right or obligation, as the case may be, of a national 
court to request a review of the very same decision. 
E. Nature of Procedure 
The final difference to be examined here between the direct control of 
article 173 and indirect control of article 177 concerns the nature of each 
procedure. An action for annulment under article 173 begins an adversary 
proceeding between the plaintiff and the Community institution that 
adopted the challenged act. By contrast, the request of a national court for 
review of a Community act under article 177 initiates a nonadversary pro-
ceeding that involves interests far greater than those of the parties to the 
litigation before the referring court. 
An examination of the participants in an article 177 proceeding may 
better convey its true nature. Under article 20 of its governing statute, the 
Court of Justice must invite not only the parties to the main litigation, but 
also all Member States, the Commission, and the Council (if the validity of 
its act is in question) to submit written observations on the issues raised by 
the national court.23 This participation by Community institutions and 
Member States makes it apparent that Community interests, rather than 
merely those of private parties, are at stake in an article 177 proceeding. 
Although an article 177 proceeding is formally nonadversary and thus 
has no parties in a technical sense,24 it nevertheless contains at least one 
21. See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl in SA Roquette Freres v. Council (Case 
No. 138/79), 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 3362, 3367-68 (delivered Sept. 18, 1980). 
22. See Commission of European Coal & Steel Co=unity v. Liquidator ofFerriere Sant' 
Anna SpA (Case No. 168/82), 1983 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1681 (Preliminary Ruling). 
23. Under art. 41 of the ECSC treaty any national court questioning the validity of an act 
is obliged to request its review by the Court. The Protocol on the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Economic Co=unity, Apr. 17, 1957, art. 20, 298 U.N.T.S. 147 (1958), 
states: 
In cases provided for under Article 177 of this Treaty, the decision of the domestic 
court or tribunal which suspends its proceedings and makes a reference to the Court shall 
be notified to the Court by the domestic court or tribunal concerned. Such decision shall 
then be notified by the registrar to the parties in the case, to the Member States and to the 
Commission, and also to the Council if the act whose validity or interpretation is in dis-
pute originates from the Council. 
The parties, the Member States, the Commission and, where appropriate, the Council 
are entitled to submit to the Court, within a period of two months after the latter notifica-
tion, memoranda or written co=ents. 
24. See, e.g., RheinmOhlen Dusseldorfv. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fUr Getreide und Fut-
1236 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1229 
element of an adversary proceeding. That is, the Community institution 
that adopted the challenged act is always invited to "defend" its validity.25 
Under the Statute of the Court, the Commission is always to be invited to 
submit written observations and participate in the proceeding, regardless of 
whether its act is to be reviewed; the Council, however, is similarly invited 
only if its act is to be reviewed, a situation which underlines its defensive 
role in the proceeding. This role should not be overemphasized, however. 
Although the Community institution that adopted a challenged act must be 
given the opportunity to defend it, its right of defense is not as extensive as 
that in an adversary prbceeding such as an annulment action. Moreover, 
aside from this right of defense, the procedure under article 177 for review 
of a Community act lacks any of the essential and characteristic features of 
an adversary proceeding. 
II. CONVERGENCE OF THE GROUNDS OF ILLEGALITY AND INVALIDITY 
The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice reveals some convergence of 
the direct control of article 173 and the indirect control of article 177. This 
convergence first appeared in the relation between the grounds of i//ega!ity 
under article 173 and the grounds of invalidity under article 177. While 
article 177 fails to state the criteria for assessing invalidity, the Court of 
Justice apparently has extended the grounds of illegality stated in article 
173, and interpreted by its case law, to cases brought under article 177.26 It 
has reviewed the validity of acts in their formal and substantive sense in 
much the same way as it has done when examining the legality of acts 
under article 173.27 In any event, the Court has not interpreted the grounds 
of invalidity more restrictively than the grounds of illegality. Yet there 
would be good reason to do so, considering that a Community act may be 
declared invalid after it has been applied and enforced by Community and 
national authorities for a considerable length of time. A declaration of in-
validity under such circumstances may raise special problems concerning 
termittel (Case No. 6/71), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 719, 719 (Preliminary Ruling); Firma 
Kurt A. Becher v. Hauptzollamt Mtlnchen-Landsbergerstrasse (Case No. 13/67), 1968 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 196, 197 (Preliminary Ruling); Hessische Knappschaft v. Maison Singer et 
Fils (Case No. 44/65), 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 965,971 (Preliminary Ruling); Order of the 
Court in Costa v. ENEL (Case No. 6/64), 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 614, 614 (Preliminary 
Ruling) (issued June 3, 1964). 
25. See note 24 supra. 
26. See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Trabucchi in Deuka v. Einfuhr- und Vorratss-
telle filr Getreide und Futtermittel (Case No. 78/74), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 435, 438 
(Preliminary Ruling); de Wilmars, Annu!alion el appreciation de validile dans le Traile CEE: 
Convergence OU divergence?, in EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSBARKEIT UNO NATIONALE VERFAS-
SUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT - FESTSCHRIFT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG VON HANS KUTSCHER 283, 
293 (W. Grewe, H. Rupp & H. Schneider eds. 1981). 
27. See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mayras in Bagusat KG v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-
Packhof (Case No. 37/75), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1339, 1347 (Preliminary Ruling); Opin-
ion of Mr. Advocate General Gand in Firma C. Schwarze v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ftlr 
Getreide und Futtermittel (Case No. 16/65), 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 891, 893 (Preliminary 
Ruling); Opinion of Mr Advocate General Roemer in N.V. Internationale Crediet- en Handel-
svereniging 'Rotterdam' v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij (Nos. 73-74/63), 1964 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 16, 20 (Preliminary Ruling). 
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the goals of ensuring legal certainty and meeting the legitimate expectations 
of concerned parties. 
The grounds of invalidity and illegality, as reflected in the case law of 
the Court, are not only identical but also interdependent. There is a mu-
tual, reciprocal relation between them. Thus, in rulings under article 177, 
the Court frequently refers to reasoning contained in judgments rendered in 
adversary proceedings under article 173. Furthermore - and this is quite 
significant - the Court has developed a ground of invalidity in review pro-
ceedings that is now of great importance in annulment proceedings: it has 
recognized the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals, not for-
mally guaranteed by the EEC Treaty, as a general principle of the Commu-
nity legal order in review proceedings under article 177, 28 and has 
subsequently adopted this principle as a ground of annulment as well.29 
Further convergence of the review procedure with the annulment proce-
dure may be noted in the Court of Justice's practice of raising, on its own 
motion, grounds of invalidity in addition to those already charged by the 
referring national court.30 In Rewe-Handelsgesel/schaft Nord mbH v. 
Hauptzollamt Kiel,31 a German court questioned the validity of a Council 
regulation on the grounds that it infringed the principles of equality, free-
dom of competition, and proportionality. Acting on its own motion, the 
Court examined the validity of this regulation as to its statement of reasons, 
and on this ground declared it invalid.32 In SA Roque/le Freres v. French 
State - Customs Administration,33 a French court requested, pursuant to 
28. See Testa v. Bundesanstalt filr Arbeit (Nos. 41, 121, 796/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 1979, 1996-97 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 18); Pecastaing v. Belgium (Case No. 
98/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 691, 716 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground Nos. 21-22); Hauer 
v. Land Rhineland-Pfalz (Case No. 44/79), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, 3744-45 (Prelimi-
nary Ruling) (ground No. 15); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vor-
ratsstelle for Getreide und Futtermittel (Case No. 11/70), 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 
1134 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 4); Stauder v. City of Ulm (Case No. 29/69), 1969 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419,425 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 7). 
29. See Heintz van Landewyck Sarl v. Commission of the Eur. Communities (Nos. 209-15, 
218/78), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, 3248 (ground No. 81); National Panasonic v. Com-
mission of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 136/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2033, 2057 
(ground No. 18). q: Valsabbia v. Commission of the Eur. Communities (Nos. 154,205, 206, 
226-28, 263-64/78 and 31, 39, 83, 85/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 907, 1010-11 (ground 
Nos. 88-89); J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission of the Eur. Commu-
nities (Case No. 4/73), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 507 (ground No. 13). 
30. See Strehl v. Nationaal Pensioensfonds voor Mijnwerkers (Case No. 62/76), 1977 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 211, 217 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 10); N.V. Internationale 
Crediet- en Handelsvereniging 'Rotterdam' v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij (Nos. 73-
74/63), 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 14 (Preliminary Ruling). 
31. (Case No. 158/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1805, 1832 (ground No. 19) (Prelimi-
nary Ruling). 
32. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1832, 1834. 
33. (Case No. 145/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2917 (Preliminary Ruling). For com-
ments on this case, see Brown, Agrimonetary Byzantinism and Prospective Overruling, 18 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 509 (1981); Laurent, La complexite des montants compensatoires source de 
perturbation dans la cooperation judiciaire instituee par /'art. 177 du traite de Rome, 101 GAZ. 
PAL. Docrn. & CHRON. 165 (1981); Usher, Invalid Monetary Compensation and Prospective 
Compensation, 6 EuR. L. REv. 116-19 (1981); Note, 1981 D.S. Jur. 168. 
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article 177, an interpretation of article 40 of the EEC Treaty34 and some 
provisions of Council Regulation No. 974/71, which imposed monetary 
compensatory amounts on agricultural products.35 Specifically, the French 
court sought a ruling on the methods that the Commission employed in 
calculating these amounts. However, the Court stated that "[t]he questions 
. . . indirectly request an appraisal of the validity of the provisions of the 
regulations whereby the Commission established the compensatory 
amounts . . . ."36 Following its well-settled case law, the Court ruled that 
it is for the referring national court to decide whether or not the questions 
raised were relevant for the pending litigation. But the Court reserved for 
itself the power, as it has done in other cases, "to extract from all the infor-
mation provided by the national court those points of Community law 
which, having regard to the subject-matter of the dispute, require interpre-
tation, or whose validity requires appraisal."37 
While the Court of Justice's practice of raising grounds of illegality in 
annulment proceedings on its own motion has been accepted generally, its 
similar practice with respect to grounds of invalidity in review proceedings 
has been criticized sharply as inconsistent with the cooperative relationship 
between the Court and national courts as established by article 177.38 Such 
a practice, it is argued, infringes upon the jurisdiction of the referring na-
tional court, and is contrary to the delimitation of competence between the 
Court of Justice and national courts contained in article 177, which distin-
guishes between the interpretation and review of Community acts by the 
Court of Justice and their application by national courts. Differences be-
tween annulment and review proceedings may suggest that the Court's 
practice of raising grounds on its own motion is more defensible in the for-
mer situation than in the latter. In an annulment proceeding, the Court 
merely goes beyond the charges invoked by the plaintiff, rather than by a 
referring national court as in a review proceeding. Moreover, in an annul-
ment proceeding, the Court not only interprets but also applies Community 
law and decides the case; in a review proceeding, the national court applies 
Community law as interpreted by the Court and rules on the litigation. In 
raising grounds of invalidity on its own motion, the Court may push the 
examination of the validity of an act further than requested by the referring 
national court. The differences between the annulment and review proce-
dures thus give rise to delicate considerations of the proper role of the 
Court of Justice. 
Nonetheless, considering the fundamental objective ofa review of valid-
ity, the power of the Court to raise grounds of invalidity on its own motion 
should be defended firmly. Indeed, this practice is particularly important in 
34. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 40, sets forth the means by which the Co=unity is to 
establish a co=on agricultural policy. 
35. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 974/71, On certain measures of conjectural policy to be 
taken in agriculture, Arts. 1-2, [Eng. Special Ed. 1971(1)) O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 106/1) 257-
58 (May 12, 1971). 
36. Roque/le Freres, 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 2936 (ground No. 6) (emphasis added), 
37. 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 2935 (ground No. 7). 
38. Judgment of July 15, 1981, Trib. inst., Lille, 1982 D.S. Jur. 10, 11-12 note J. Boulouis; 
Judgment of May 9, 1980, Conseil d'Etat, 36 A.J.D.A. Jur. 539, 540 note C. Jordan. 
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a review proceeding because this proceeding is an objective one, seeking, 
above all, to ensure the legal exercise of Community powers. If the Court 
of Justice were limited in its review to the charges formally raised by the 
referring national court, it would be precluded from performing fully one of 
its most fundamental functions. This result cannot be the meaning of coop-
eration as envisaged by article 177. The requirement that Community pow-
ers be exercised in legal fashion, which is to be guaranteed by the review 
procedure, obviously must carry much greater weight than strict respect for 
the wording of references from national courts. 
Ill. CONVERGENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF AN ANNULMENT AND A 
DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY 
The recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice concerning the respec-
tive legal effects of an annulment and of a declaration of invalidity displays 
a striking convergence of these two remedies, despite the different Treaty 
provisions governing each of these remedies. The Treaty clearly states that 
the Court has the power to declare an act null and void.39 Consequently, 
the Court has held that the annulment of an act has a general and absolute 
effect that destroys the legal existence of the act from its very beginning, i.e., 
ex tunc.40 Thus, no national authority or Community institution may apply 
and enforce such an act, and no private party may invoke it. However, 
article 174 permits a deviation from this general rule. Under this provision, 
the Court may restrict the effect of the annulment of a regulation - a step 
that the Court has taken only in exceptional circumstances.41 
In contrast to the explicit power of the Court to declare an act void 
under the annulment procedure, the EEC Treaty is silent with respect to the 
legal consequences of a declaration of invalidity. Article 177 merely em-
poweFS the Court to review the validity of a Community act referred to it by 
a national court. The Treaty contains no further provisions concerning this 
procedure. 
A declaration of invalidity thus raises several fundamental questions 
whose answers have been only cautiously and gradually developed by the 
Court, to wit: What is the effect of a declaration of invalidity, specifically, 
its scope of application (relative or absolute) and its effect in time (ex tune 
or ex nunc)? Which authority is competent to determine the further possi-
ble consequences of such a declaration - the Court, the Community insti-
tution concerned, or the referring national court? And, finally, what are the 
consequences of a declaration of invalidity for national measures imple-
menting and applying the Community act declared invalid? These are the 
questions examined in the remainder of this Article, and, as will be seen, 
the approaches taken to date further demonstrate the continuing conver-
gence of the annulment and review procedures. 
39. See EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 174. 
40. See Commission of the Eur. Co=unities v. Council of the Eur. Co=unities (Case 
No. 22/70), 1971 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 263, 278-79. 
41. See, e.g., Co=ission of the Eur. Co=unities v. Council of the Eur. Co=unities 
(Case No. 81/72), 1973 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 575, 586. 
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A. Binding Effect of a .Declaration of Invalidity 
That a declaration of invalidity by the Court of Justice binds the refer-
ring national court has hardly ever been questioned. The only point that 
remained doubtful for some time was whether or not such a declaration 
could have an effect reaching beyond the instant case. In its original inter-
pretation, the Court merely declared an act invalid without specifying the 
effects of such a declaration.42 This may have been due to a belief on the 
part of the Court that the effect of a declaration of invalidity should be 
confined to the given case. In limiting the binding effect of such a declara-
tion to the given case, the Court also might have been anxious to avoid a 
possible assimilation with an annulment of an act. In the past, the Court 
scrupulously insisted on a neat separation between the two remedies. 
Among the various statements on this point, the opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Gand is particularly representative of the view originally held: 
A careful distinction must be drawn between the extent and the effects of 
an annulment of a measure on application under Article 173, and a decla-
ration of invalidity under Article 177. In the first case, the action is initi-
ated by a person who enjoys a right to appeal; it is subject to a strict time-
limit, to avoid prolonging the period of doubt. The wide effects of a suc-
cessful appeal are balanced by the restrictions on its admissibility. Ana-
tional court or tribunal, on the other hand, can at any time request a ruling 
on the validity of a measure against which the time for appealing has long 
since expired. It refers a dispute to you in order to enable it to decide a 
case before it, and it is sufficient if the effects of your judgment are con-
fined to the framework of that case. Were we to do otherwise and give 
general effect to the declaration of invalidity, we would, in effect, be reviv-
ing a right of action time-barred under Article 173 .... 43 
42. See, e.g., Express Dairy Foods v. Intervention Bd. for Agricultural Produce (Case No, 
130/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1887, 1899 (Preliminary Ruling); S.A. Buitoni v. Fonds 
d'Orientation et de Regularisation des Marches (Case No. 122/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
677, 685 (Preliminary Ruling); Yoshida GmbH v. lndustrie- und Handelskammer Kassel 
(Case No. 114/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 151, 169 (Preliminary Ruling); Yoshida Neder-
land B.V. v. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken vor Friesland (Case No. 34/78), 1979 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 115, 136 (Preliminary Ruling); Firrna Milac, Gross- und Aussenhandel 
Arnold Nfill v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrtlcken (Case No. 131/77), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep, 
1041, 1051 (Preliminary Ruling); Societe Les Commissionaires Reunis v. Receveur des 
Douanes (Nos. 80-81/77), 1978 E. Comm. Ct.~- Rep. 927, 947 (Preliminary Ruling); Manzoni 
v. Fonds National de Retraite des Ouvriers Mineurs (Case No. 112/76), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J, 
Rep. 1647, 1656 (Preliminary Ruling); Olmtihle Hamburg AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg 
Waltershof (Nos. 119-20/76), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1269, 1287 (Preliminary Ruling); 
Granaria BY v. Hoofproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten (Case No. 116/76), 1977 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1247, 1266 (Preliminary Ruling); Bela-Mahle Josef Bergman KG v. Grows-
Fann GmbH (Case No. 114/76), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1211, 1221 (Preliminary Ruling); 
Strehl v. Nationaal Pensionenfonds voor Mijnwerkers (Case No. 62/76), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 211, 218 (Preliminary Ruling); Effem GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Lilneburg (Case No. 
95/75), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 361, 368 (Preliminary Ruling); Rey Soda v. Cassa Con-
guaglio Zucchero (Case No. 23/75), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1279, 1306 (Preliminary Rul-
ing); Petroni v. Office national des pensions pour travailleurs salaries (Case No. 24/75), 1975 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1149, 1161 (Preliminary Ruling); Niemann v. Bundesversicherungsan-
stalt fi1r Angestellte (Case No. 191/73), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 571, 580 (Preliminary 
Ruling). 
43. Opinion of Mr Advocate General Gand in Firrna C. Schwarze v. Einfuhr- und Vor-
ratsstelle filr Getreide und Futtermittel (Case No. 16/65), 196S C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1099, 
1109-10 (Preliminary Ruling) (delivered Oct. 28, 1965) [Author's translation - Ed.]. 
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Nonetheless, convergence between the effect of an annulment and that 
ofa declaration of invalidity practically was unavoidable in the long run. It 
is inconceivable that the Court of Justice, once it declared an act invalid, 
would later reverse its declaration on the reference of another national 
court. In International Chemical Corporation v. Amministrazione de/le 
Finanze de/lo Stato,44 the Court recognized the general effect of a declara-
tion of invalidity. Here a national court, dealing with a Council regulation 
that the Court had already declared invalid, inquired whether this declara-
tion had an effect erga omnes (i.e., general) or whether it was binding only 
on the referring court.45 In holding that a declaration of invalidity has a 
general effect, the Court stated: ' 
[A]lthough a judgment of the Court given under Article 177 of the Treaty 
declaring an act of an institution, in particular a Council or Commission 
regulation, to be void is directly addressed only to the national court which 
brought the matter before the Court, it is sufficient reason for any other 
national court to regard that act as invalid for the purposes of a judgment 
which it has to give.46 
The restrained formulation that a declaration of invalidity is "sufficient rea-
son" for other national courts to regard the act as invalid suggests that the 
effect of such a declaration is indeed general, but formally not absolute. 
According to the Court, any national court may request the review of an 
act already declared invalid.47 This right of national courts to make a sub-
sequent reference applies "in particular if questions arise as to the grounds, 
the scope and possibly the consequences of the invalidity established ear-
lier."48 By permitting subsequent references, the Court seeks, it seems, to 
maintain a subtle difference between the effect of a declaration of invalidity 
and that of an annulment. Whereas an act declared invalid still may be 
reviewed, this is clearly not the case with an annulment. Once the Court 
has declared an act null and void, it ceases to exist in a legal sense. This 
result excludes a priori any subseq~ent annulment action (which would be 
unlikely in any event given the two-month time period within which such 
actions must be brought). Compared with a declaration of invalidity, then, 
an annulment has a truly absolute effect. The importance of this subtle 
difference should not be overestimated, however. The Court may admit a 
renewed reference not so much to reexamine the invalidity of an act but to 
rule on some of the ancillary questions of such a declaration - for exam-
ple, its possible effect on a national measure implementing the act or its 
further consequences. 
The Court thus has clarified a rather equivocal jurisprudence respecting 
the distinctive functions of the annulment and review procedures, which 
44. (Case No. 66/80), 1981 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1191 (Preliminary Ruling). For a com-
ment on this case, see Usher, .Declaration of Invalidity Under Article 177 EEC· of General 
Effect?, 6 EuR. L. REV. 284 (1981). 
45. See 1981 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1213. 
46. 1981 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1215 (ground No. 13) (emphasis added). 
41. See 1981 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1215 (ground No. 14). 
48. 1981 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1215 (ground No. 14). The term "grounds" here is not 
used in the technical sense of a ground of invalidity, but rather refers to the reasoning support-
ing the ruling. This may be deduced from the original Italian version of the Court's ruling, 
which speaks of "motivi." The French text uses the expression "motifs." 
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had previously suggested that a declaration of invalidity was to be given 
merely relative, and not general, effect. In giving declarations of invalidity 
general effect, the Court has promoted two fundamental Community goals. 
First, the general effect of such declarations strengthens the fundamental 
objective of article 177 to ensure the uniform application of Community 
law throughout the Community.49 Second, such general effect comports 
with the "imperative requirement" of legal certainty, which would be seri-
ously endangered if another national court were to apply a Community act 
that had already been declared invalid.50 
B. The Temporal Effect of a .Declaration of Invalidity 
While the Court of Justice recognized the general binding effect of a 
declaration of invalidity in International Chemical Corporation, 51 it dis-
closed little about the temporal effect of such a declaration. Obviously, a 
declaration of invalidity operates prospectively to terminate the validity of 
the Community act in question and exclude its future application. Delicate 
and somewhat controversial questions are raised, however, by the possible 
retroactive effect of such a declaration, particularly with respect to ensuring 
legal certainty and meeting the legitimate expectations of concerned parties. 
The controversy on this point is reflected in the changing views of the 
Advocates-General. Early on, they advocated giving declarations of in-
validity only an effect ex nunc, ie., prospectively from the date that the 
Court declared an act invalid. 52 This position clearly was meant to pre-
serve a neat distinction between an action for annulment and a review of 
validity.53 Later on, however, the Advocates-General argued that declara-
tions of invalidity should be given an effect ex tune, ie., retroactively to the 
time of enactment of the act. In dealing with the effect of a declaration of 
the invalidity of a Commission regulation that had imposed a monetary 
compensatory amount collected by national authorities, where reimburse-
ment was sought by a party before the referring national court, Advocate 
General Capotorti briefly observed that ''where the invalidity of a Commu-
nity regulation has been established by the Court, it operates ex tunc."54 
Advocate General Reischl went even further, maintaining that a declara-
tion of invalidity has the same effect as .a judgment of annulment, and 
49. See 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1215 (ground No. 11). 
50. See 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1215 (ground No. 12). 
51. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. 
52. See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Gand in Firma C. Schwarze v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle filr Getreide und Futtermittel (Case No. 16/65), 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 891, 
899 (Preliminary Ruling) (delivered Oct. 28, 1965). 
53. See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Warner in Manwni v. Fonds National de Re-
traite des Ouvriers Mineurs (Case No. 112/76), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1657, 1661-62 
(Preliminary Ruling) (delivered Sept. 20, 1977); Opinion of Mr Advocate General Trabucchi 
in Hauptwllamt Bielefeld v. Kilniig (Case No. 185/73), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 621, 623; 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Roemer in Getreide and Futtermittel Handelsgellschraft v. 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg Altona (Case No. 31/70), 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1065, 1071. 
54. Opinion of Mr Advocate General Capotorti in Express Dairy Foods v. Intervention 
Bd. for Agricultural Produce (Case No. 130/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1903, 1909 (Pre-
liminary Ruling) (delivered May 6, 1980). 
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thereby implying that such a declaration must be given retroactive effect.55 
So far the Court has preferred to follow a rather pragmatic approach, 
taking into account the particularities of each case. It thus is difficult to 
deduce a clear rule from the Court's jurisprude:11-ce. In most cases, the 
Court simply has declared an act invalid without stating the temporal effect 
of such a declaration. 56 In a few cases, the Court has declared a regulation 
invalid and, at the same time, obliged the Community institution that 
adopted it "to take any necessary measures compatible with Community 
law."57 In general, then, the Court seems to leave it to the competent Com-
munity institution to draw the necessary conclusions as to the effects of a 
declaration of invalidity, including its temporal effect. 
Exceptions nonetheless may be found in the Court's decisions in Societe 
Cooperative 'Providence Agricole de la Champagne" v. Office National Inter-
professionne/ des Cerea/es,58 Sari Maiseries de Beauce v. Office National In-
teprofessionne/ des Cereales,59 and SA Roquette Freres v. French State -
Customs Administration.60 In these cases the Court restricted the temporal 
effect of declarations that invalidated a regulation in a manner analogous to 
that provided for annulments under article 174. These cases concerned the 
proper method of calculating monetary compensatory amounts on certain 
derived agricultural products under Commission Regulation No. 652/76. 
The Court found that the Commission had exceeded the discretion con-
ferred on it by the Council Regulation No. 974/71, and therefore declared 
the Commission regulation invalid to that extent. The Court added, how-
ever, that private parties could not claim reimbursement for charges already 
paid under the invalid portion of the Commission regulation.61 By giving 
its declaration of invalidity prospective effect only, the Court upheld the 
prior validity of the regulation and thereby provoked a controversy that will 
be examined below in connection with the powers of the Court under arti-
cle 177. For the moment, simply observe that because the Court considered 
it necessary to state explicitly that its declarations of invalidity in these 
cases only operated prospectively, the general rule seems to be that such 
declarations operate retroactively as well. 
55. See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl in International Chem. Corp. v. Ad-
ministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Case No. 66/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1224, 
1229 (Preliminary Ruling) (delivered Jan. 21, 1981). 
56. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. 
51. See Royal Scholten-Honig Ltd. v. Intervention Bd. for Agricultural Produce (Nos. 103, 
145/77), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2037, 2081 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 86); SA 
Moulins et Huileries de Pont-a-Mousson v. Office National Interprofessionnel des Cereales 
(Nos. 124/76 and 20/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1795, 1813 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground 
No. 28); Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg St. Annen (Nos. ll7/76 and 
16/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1753, 1772 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 13). 
58. (Case No. 4/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2823 (Preliminary Ruling). 
59. (Case No. 109/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2883 (Preliminary Ruling). 
60. (Case No. 145/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2917 (Preliminary Ruling). 
61. See, e.g., Roquette Freres, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2947 (ground No. 53). 
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C. Which Authorities JJetermine the Consequences of Annulment and 
Invalidity? 
1. Power of the Court 
When annulling a regulation the Court also may, under article 174, de-
termine the further effects of such an annulment. The Treaty explicitly con-
fers this exceptional power on the Court only when it annuls a regulation 
under article 173. However, as already noted, the Court made analogous 
use of this power when it declared a regulation invalid under article 177 in 
"Providence Agricole de la Champagne," Md/series de Beauce, and Roque/le 
Freres. 62 ' · 
The referring French court, the Tribunal d'Instance de Lille, refused to 
follow the Court's preliminary ruling precisely because it felt that the Court 
had exceeded its power. 63 First, it contested the power of the Court to de-
termine the consequences of a declaration of invalidity through use of arti-
cle 174 by analogy. In the opinion of the French court, the ruling lacked 
legal foundation because the Court was without authority to do this. Sec-
ond, the French court felt that such a ruling - which, it stressed, reviewed 
the validity of the regulation even though the Court of Justice was not ex-
plicitly requested to do so64 - could not modify the respective functions of 
the Court of Justice and national courts established by article 177. Conse-
quently, national courts, the French court claimed, retained their compe-
tence to determine what effects a declaration of invalidity by the Court of 
Justice may have in the national legal order. Thus, the Tribunal of Lille, as 
well as other French courts, categorically deny the existence of the Court of 
Justice's authority to rule on the consequences of a declaration of invalidity. 
This position challenges the fundamental jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice. The double function performed by the Court's analogous applica-
tion of article 174 to declarations of invalidity should be understood. First, 
it serves as an indispensable means for ensuring the uniform application 
and validity of Community acts. Second, it is an important element in 
strengthening the indirect judicial control provided by article 177 and thus 
fostering the rule of law. 
Before more specific grounds that justify the analogous application of 
article 174 in the case of declarations of invalidity are advanced, however, a 
general observation should be made. Compared with the Treaty provisions 
governing the procedure for annulment, article 177 is very general. It 
seems, therefore, entirely appropriate for the Court to analogize to other 
Treaty provisions to make the review procedure embodied in article 177 
workable and efficient. 
62. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text. 
63. See Judgment of July 15, 1981, Trib. inst., Lille, 1982 D.S. Jur. 10, 11-13 note J, 
Boulouis. In this regard, see also Judgment of Jan. 19, 1983, Cour d'appel, Douai, 103 Gaz. 
Pal. Jur. 292 (1983); Judgment of Feb. 23, 1982, Trib. admin., Orleans (Ma'iseries de Beauce, 
not yet reported); Judgment of Trib. admin., Chlllons-sur-Mame (Providence Agricole de la 
Champagne, not yet reported). 
64. For this reason, in Judgment of Jan. 19, 1983, Cour d'appel, Douai, 103 Gaz. Pal. Jur. 
292 (1983), the Court considered the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice to be a mere 
recommendation. A greater challenge to the Court's jurisdiction under article 177 hardly can 
be imagined. 
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In particular, the analogous application of article 174 to declarations of 
invalidity made under article 177 may be defended on several grounds. To 
begin, a declaration of invalidity and its consequences are obviously closely 
related.65 Both are matters of Community law and thus fall under the"juris-
diction of the Court of Justice. Any interpretation of the Treaty that seeks 
to claim, under whatever pretext, exclusive jurisdiction for national courts 
to determine the consequences of declarations of invalidity clearly is incom-
patible with the fundamental requirement of the uniform application and 
validity of Community law. In reasserting its exclusive jurisdiction to de-
termine the temporal effect of a preliminary interpretive ruling, the Court of 
Justice stated in Amministrazione de/le Finanze de/lo Stato v . .Denkavit Ital-
iano S.r.l:66 "The fundamental need for a general and uniform application 
of Community law implies that it is for the Court of Justice alone to decide 
upon the temporal restrictions to be placed on the interpretation which it 
lays down."67 This consideration is equally valid with respect to the power 
of the Court to determine the effects of a declaration of invalidity - as the 
Court somewhat timidly stated in International Chemical Corporation.68 
A second ground on which the analogous application of article 174 may 
be defended is that, if the Court may declare a Community regulation in-
valid under article 177, it would be inconsistent to deny it the lesser power 
of determining the effects of such a declaration, including its temporal ef-
fect. The function served by declarations of invalidity would be endangered 
seriously if national courts could draw different conclusions than the Court 
of Justice as to the legal consequences of such declarations. 
Third, since a declaration of invalidity has, ih principle, a retroactive 
effect,69 it seems indispensable that the Court should have a power with 
respect to such declarations analogous to that exercised by it under article 
174 with respect to annulments. Indeed, there would appear to be even 
weightier reason~ for having it in the case of a declaration of invalidity. A 
regulation may be declared invalid at any time, even after it has been ap-
plied and enforced for a considerable period of time. This raises more com-
plex problems than a mere annulment, which necessarily takes place in a 
relatively short time after enactment of the regulation and requires the 
Court to follow a pragmatic approach emphasizing the goal of the uniform 
application and validity of Community law as much as that of legal 
certainty. 
Fourth, since a declaration of invalidity has a general effect throughout 
the Community, its further legal consequences should be general and uni-
65. See Waelbroeck, May the Court of Justice Limit the Retrospective Operation of its Judg-
ments?, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 115, 122 (1982). 
66. (Case No. 61/79), 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1205 (Preliminary Ruling). 
67. 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1224 (ground No. 18) (emphasis added). This view was 
reaffirmed in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. S.a.s Mediterranea lmportazione, 
Rappresentanze, Esportazione, Co=ercio (Case No. 826/79), 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 
2559, 2573 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 9), and Amministrazione delle Finanze dello 
Stato v. S.r.l. Meridionale Industria Salumi (Nos. 66, 127-28/79), 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 
1237, 1261 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 11). 
68. See International Chem. Corp. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Case No. 
66/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1191, 1215 (Preliminary Ruling) (ground No. 14). 
69. See notes 53-62 supra and accompanying text. 
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form as well. This result can only be ensured if the Court of Justice de-
clares what those consequences are. It would contradict article 189 to 
recognize the uniform applicability and validity of a regulation without en-
suring the uniform effects of a declaration of its invalidity by the Court. 
Finally, the argument has been raised that the analogous application of 
article 174 to article 177 declarations of invalidity should be prohibited be-
cause any other result would allow the Court of Justice to not only interpret 
Community law, but also to apply it, a power article 177 reserves to the 
referring national court.70 This argument misrepresents the actual function 
of the analogous application of article 174, however. A preliminary ruling 
of the Court, whether interpreting a Community rule or declaring an act 
invalid, of course, may predetermine the outcome of litigation pending 
before the referring national court. But this fact does not mean that the 
Court applies Community law or even that it decides such a litigation. A 
preliminary ruling that finds a Community rule to have a direct effect also 
predetermines the final outcome of litigation, as it obliges the referring na-
tional court to forgo the application of contrary national law. And yet no 
referring national courts have found that such rulings by the Court have 
deprived them of their jurisdiction to apply Community law and thus de-
cide the litigation. Given this, and the other arguments previously set forth, 
an analogous application of article 174 to declarations of invalidity under 
article 177 is justified fully. 
2. Obligations of the Community Institutions 
Article 176 of the EEC Treaty obliges the Community institution whose 
act has been annulled by the Court to "take the measures required for the 
implementation of the judgment of the Court of Justice."71 This obligation 
applies to the annulment of any binding Community act. Does a Commu-
nity institution have a similar obligation when one of its acts is found in-
valid? The Treaty lacks any provision on this point, so the analogous 
application of article 176 to declarations of invalidity should be considered. 
Early on, the Court of Justice merely declared an act invalid. It neither 
stated the temporal effect of such a declaration nor mentioned any possible 
obligation of Community institutions to adopt measures made necessary by 
such a declaration.72 More recently, in some rulings, the Court has obliged 
Community institutions to adopt such measures.73 The Court's more recent 
70. See Boulouis, supra note 39, at 12; Labayle, Le Conseil d'Etat et le renvoi prijudiciel a la 
C.J.CE., 39 A.J.D.A. DOCTR. 155, 168 (1983). 
71. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 176. 
72. See, e.g., Finna Meiko-Konservenfabrik v. Federal Republic of Germany (Case No. 
224/82) (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. July 14, 1983, not yet published) (Preliminary Ruling), digested in 
1983 ECJR 85; In re Cousin (Case No. 162/82), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1101, 1122 (Prelim-
inary Ruling); Atalanta Amsterdam v. B.V. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees (Case No. 
240/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2137, 2150-51 (Preliminary Ruling); Buitoni S.A. v. Fonds 
d'Orientation et de Regularisation des Marches (Case No. 122/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
677, 685 (Preliminary Ruling); Yoshida GmbH v. lndustrie- und Handelskammer Kassel 
(Case No. 114/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 151, 169 (Preliminary Ruling); Yoshida Neder-
land B.V. v. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken vor Friesland (Case No. 34/78), 1979 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 115, 136 (Preliminary Ruling). 
73. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
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stand may be related to the broader effect that declarations of invalidity 
now are given. Giving a wide and far-reaching effect to such declarations 
raises more complex problems than when the effect is confined to a concrete 
case. Consistent with the goal of legal certainty, a Community institution 
whose act is declared invalid should be obliged to adopt any measures nec-
essary to effectuate the declaration. 
Royal Scholten-Honig Ltd v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Pro-
duce74 and Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen15 
are the first rulings in which the Court stated that Community institutions 
have such an obligation. In the latter case the Court__;_ instead of declaring 
the Council regulation at issue invalid - simply found it incompatible with 
the principle of equal treatment. It did so because the regulation discrimi-
nated against certain producers by failing to include them among the par-
ties entitled to claim a production refund. In this instance, a declaration of 
invalidity would have been of little help to the party concerned, for it still 
would not have received the refund. For this reason, the Court declared the 
regulation incompatible with the fundamental Community principle of 
equal treatment, but preserved its validity. In this context, the Court stated: 
[l]t is for the competent institutions of the Community to adopt the mea-
sures necessary to correct this incompatibility. 
The need for a reply to this effect . . . is borne out by the existence of 
several courses of action which would enable the two products in question 
once again to be treated equally ... _76 
In International Chemical Co,poration, a leading case in this area, the 
Court was most emphatic on this point, observing that "those responsible 
for drafting regulations declared to be invalid (the Council or the Commis-
sion) are bound to determine from the Court's judgment the effects of that 
judgment."77 This formulation bears a striking resemblance to the wording 
of article 176. However, the Court so far has avoided referring explicitly to 
this Treaty provision even while apparently applying it by analogy to decla-
rations of invalidity. 
3. Obligations of the National Courts 
Two aspects of the effects and consequences of a declaration of invalid-
ity in the national legal order must be distinguished clearly. One aspect 
concerns the declaration of invalidity and its temporal effect, matters of 
Community law within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
under article 177. The other aspect relates to the consequences such a dec-
laration may have for national measures enacted pursuant to a Community 
74. (Nos. 103, 145/77), 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 2037, 2081 (Preliminary Ruling) 
(ground No. 86). 
75. (Nos. 117/76 and 16/77), 1977 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1753, 1772 (Preliminary Ruling) 
(ground No. 13). For co=entary on this case, see Nicolaysen, Case Note, 13 EuR 50 (1978); 
Wyatt, Non-discrimination under the CAP, 3 EuR. L. REv. 329 (1978). 
76. 1977 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1772 (ground No. 13); see also Moulins et Huileries de 
Pont-a-Mousson v. Office National Interprofessionnel des Cereales (Nos. 124/76, 20/77), 1977 
E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1795, 1813 (ground No. 28). . 
77. International Chem. Corp. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Case No. 
66/80), 1981 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1191, 1216 (ground No. 16) (Preliminary Ruling). 
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act found invalid, which is clearly a matter for national courts to decide 
according to national law. This latter situation very much resembles those 
instances where a national court has to determine the effect on provisions of 
national law which is contrary to a Community rule having direct effect. 
Thus, in Firma Gebriider Liick v. Hauptzollamt Koln-Rheinau, 18 which dealt 
with the consequences of the direct effect of article 95 of the EEC Treaty for 
conflicting national law, the Court ruled that it was up to the national 
courts "to apply, from among the various procedures available under na-
tional law, those which are appropriate for the purpose of protecting the 
individual rights conferred by Community law."79 This also is confirmed 
clearly by the Court's ruling in Rey Soda v. Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero. 80 
Here an Italian court inquired as to the consequences that a declaration of 
invalidity had for a national legislative measure adopted to implement the 
regulation found invalid. "It is first of all for the national authorities," rea-
soned the Court, "to draw the consequences in their legal system of the 
declaration of invalidity made under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty."81 
CONCLUSION 
The recent jurisprudence of the Court has undoubtedly reinforced the 
indirect judicial control provided by the review of Community acts under 
article 177. As far as regulations and directives are concerned, this indirect 
control practically has surpassed in its importance the direct judicial control 
of annulment under article· 173. It is only because of the indirect control 
that the validity of these acts has been reviewed at all. Despite occasional, 
unsuccessful attempts by private parties to bring annulment actions chal-
lenging regulations, the direct control mostly has been confined to decisions 
of the Commission addressed either to Member States or private parties. 
The increased importance of the indirect control of article 177, in gen-
eral, is to be welcomed. First, by recognizing the general effect of a declara-
tion of invalidity the Court has promoted the rule of law within the 
Community legal order. Second, it has, within the limits of the procedure 
provided by article 177, indirectly extended the judicial protection of pri-
vate parties against invalid Community normative acts by permitting the 
national courts, before which these parties appear, to seek review of the acts 
in the Court of Justice. Third, the Court has dispelled doubts as to the ef-
fects of a declaration of invalidity, and has strengthened the uniform appli-
cation and validity of Community law. 
The increased importance of the indirect control article 177 provides, 
however, raises some problems that should not be underestimated. In par-
ticular, the retroactive effect of a declaration of invalidity, which the Court 
seems to favor at present, may cause some difficulties. Giving retroactive 
effect to a declaration of invalidity, particularly where a regulation that has 
been applied widely by national courts for some time is involved, may cre-
ate more complex problems than the annulment of an act that has been in 
78. (Case No. 34/67), 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 245 (Preliminary Ruling). 
79. 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 251. 
80. (Case No. 23/75), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1279 (Preliminary Ruling). 
81. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1306 (ground No. 51). 
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force for a relatively short period of time. When declaring an act invalid, 
the Court necessarily will have to consider the legitimate expectations of 
affected parties and the goal of legal certainty to a greater extent than in the 
case of an annulment. For this reason, and because the annulment of a 
regulation is very rare due to the inaction of Member States, the Court may 
be expected to apply article 174 by analogy more frequently in the case of 
declarations of invalidity than it has done so far. 
